D. President Trump in his Official Capacity
Defendants seek to dismiss President Trump as a defendant because the court may not
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. MTD at 3537; id. at 36 & n.7
(collecting cases). The court agrees. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475,
501 (1866) (holding Court had no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties). States concede the court may not enjoin President Trump
but argue that a declaratory judgment may issue against the President under National Treasury
Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Oppn at 3738. That case
recognized a narrow circumstance in which a court may issue a declaratory judgment
recognizing the Presidents constitutional duty to perform a ministerial duty. 492 F.2d at 608.
For declaratory judgment to be appropriate, the duty cannot be discretionary and must be
simple, definite[,] . . . arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by
law. Id. at 60809. The Presidents power to select and nominate officers under the
Appointments Clause is highly discretionary and assigned squarely to the President. Declaratory
judgment against the President, a coequal branch of government, pertaining to the Executives
exclusive powers under the Constitution at best creates an unseemly appearance of
constitutional tension and at worst risks a violation of the constitutional separation of powers.
Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Consequently, the court will dismiss
President Trump as a d